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No. 79-870-ADX

(Holder ,

S.D. Ind.

J.)

UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD

v.
FRITZ
1.

Timely

Federal/Civil
SUMMARY.

The SG appeals from a DC decision holding

that a classification in the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974,
which defines which employees are entitled to retain their

---...

double-dipping rights, is so arbitrary and capricious that it
violates due process.
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2.

FACTS.

Prior to 1975, an individual who worked

for~

years in the railroad industry, and who had been employed
outside the railroad industry for a sufficient period to
qualify for Social Security benefits could receive benefits
under both Acts, which totalled more than the benefits receiv
by employees under either Act who worked the same length of
time, but did not split the time between railroad and

-

nonrailroad work.
double-dipping.

Congress decided to eliminate this
This goal was accomplished by the Railroad

Retirement Act of 1974, 45

u.s.c.

§

231 et seq.

However,

Congress decided that the expectations of some employees under
the old scheme should not be frustrated.

Thus, the elimination

of those benefits was to be accomplished gradually.
Individuals who were retired and receiving benefits by the
effective date of the Act, Jan. 1, 1975, continued to be
eligible for 100% of their benefits under the old scheme, as
did employees with 25-years of railroad service and permanently
insured by Social Security, but not yet retired. v.;hose still
working, but not permanently

insured · ~ under

Jan. 1, 1975 were denied all dual benefits.

Social Security on
Employees not yet

retired who had more than ten, but less than 25 years of
service in the railroad industry, and thus were permanently
insured under th e Railroad Retirement Act and who also were
permanently insured under Social Security, were divided ·into
two groups.

Those who were then currently affiliated with the

Railroad industry, i.e., who had worked in the industry at
least one day in
I"-./..

\ j

1974~r

who had worked in the industry in 12

of the preceding 30 calendar months, were entitled to the

\

1974 received a windfall benefit in a substantially lower·
amount.

The DC estimated that members of appee's class lost

approximately $88 per month as a result of the classification.
Petn 25a.
3.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW.

Appee, an employee with more than

10 and less than 25 years of service in the railroad industry,
who was permanently insured under Social Security in 1974, who
retired after Dec. 31, 1974, was substituted as plaintiff in a
suit to compel appt to treat employees with no current
connection with the railroad industry like employees with the
same record of service currently with the industry, and a class
of former railroad workers in appee's situation was
certified.
c~

The DC found the distinction based on current

connection with the railroad industry arbitrary and not
rationally related to the purposes of the statute.

The DC

found that the purposes of the 1974 Act were to place the
I

Railroad Retirement Fund on a sound actuarial basis and to

..

protect completely the rights of those persons entitled before
'

Dec. 31, 1974, to receive their full benefits under both Acts •

.

Looking to the legislative history, the DC rejected the
government's suggestion that Congress' purpose was to favor
"career'' railroad employees over others.
employees with 25 years ' of service as

11

Congress treated

career 11 employees.

Under the "current ~£filiation'' requirement, an employee with
20 years of service who left the industry prior to 1974 would
be ineligible, while a current railroad employee with only 11
years of service would be eligible.

\

The DC also found the

arbitrariness of the classification heightened by the fayt that
during critical negotiations over the bill which became the

(

1974 Act, the labor union deserted appee•s class in order to
obtain an increase in benefits for persons who were still union
members.

The DC also found that Congress was unaware that it

had created this distinction which harmed appee•s class, and
that it was Congress• purpose to protect appee•s class.
4.

CONTENTIONS.

not arbitrary.

The SG argues that the classification is

His first argument is that since Congress could

have eliminated the dual benefit
Nestor, 363

u.s.

altogether,~'

Fleming v.

603, 610-11, it was free to choose this

"reasonable middle ground."

His second argument, with which

there is no dispute, is that no suspect classification is

_______.,

involved.

(

The SG next attacks the DC 1 s reasoning.

First, it was not

Congress• purpose to protect all "vested" benefits, as the face
of the statute demonstrates.

Although the body which was

formulated to advise Congress on this matter, the Commission on
Railroad Retirement, recommended that all "vested" benefits be
protected, the Joint Labor-Management Negotiation Committee
suggested a

11

refinement," which was adopted by Congress.

Further, Congress must be assumed to have been aware of what it
enacted.
The SG also argues that the fact that union negotiators may
have failed fairly to represent the interests of appee•s class
is irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.

Next, the SG

criticizes the DC for commenting that there were other ways to
(

-

correct the fiscal problems of the railroad retirement system.

\

the SG appears to assert what he believes to be a

~1na11y,

(

rational basis for the classification:

"Congress presumably

shared the view of the Joint Committee that individuals who
left the industry had a diminished equitable claim to
•windfall 1 benefits .

Brief for

"

u.s.

at 23.

Appee argues that the only distinction at issue concerns
the timing of employees• railroad service and that this
distinction is irrational.

Appee emphasizes that employees

with more total service in the industry may be deprived solely
because they left the industry prior to , l974.

The

current-affiliation test does not measure industry loyalty
{even if such a factor were rational) because most members of
appee•s class were forced out of railroading by declines in the
industry.

Appee also emphasizes that Congress did not

understand what it was doing, that Congress was misled by labor
leaders, and that labor leaders resacrificed" appee•s class.
Appee contends that the divestiture of appee•s class can be
directly traced to an increase in benefits to three groups of
present beneficiaries.
The Railway Labor Conference and the Railway Labor
Executives• Association have filed amicus briefs in support of
the jurisdictional statement.
5.

DISCUSSION.

There is an initial problem as to whether

a three-judge court should have been convened.
complaint was filed before repeal
provision.

of the three-judge court

However, the complaint was amended after the

effective date of the repeal.

(~~

The original

The DC ruled that the amended

complaint did not relate back to the original filing for
'

\

purposes of the three-judge court provision.

The SG agrees.

The SG notes that relation back is relevant here only for
purposes of the 3-judge court provision, which is to be
strictly construed.

Appt was named only in the amenQed

complaint, and the original named plaintiffs did not have
standing because they were not yet eligible to receive
benefits.

Apparently appee does not contend that a 3-judge

court should have been convened.

I see no reason for the Court

to remand this case for consideration by a 3-judge court.
The SG's criticisms of the DC's opinion are legitimate for

1the

most part.

-----

It is difficult to conclude that Congress
....__

~id

not intend to divest appee's class when the legislation enacted
by Congress did so.

If Congress really did not intend the

result seemingly accomplished by the face of the statute,
perhaps the court should have merely construed the statute
rather than reaching the constitutional question.

Whether

there were other methods to protect the fiscal integrity of the
fund seems irrelevant to me.

The most effective method would

have been to eliminate the double benefit entirely for the
group of employees with appees' length of service in the
industry.

The fiscal effect would have beenthe same if

Congress had divided the benefit given to those employees with
a "current affiliation" between the two groups of competing
employees.

Although the overall purpose of the 1974 Act was to

ensure the fiscal integrity of the fund, I do not think that
purpose is relevant to the classification drawn here.

The SG's attack on the DC st1 1 does not provide a rational

(~

reason for the classification.

I find the "comparative

equities" justification, which is the
weak.

onl~

one offered, very

I also think that it is legitimate for the court

scrutinizing a statute to examine the process which led to its
enactment and that the fact that labor negotiators sacrificed
appees is of some relevance.

However, under rational basis

scrutiny, not much of a justification is required.

My

inclination is that the DC was correct, but a substantial
enough question is presented that this case probably should be
noted.
There is a response and two amicus briefs.

Hair
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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

October 5, 1980

From: Greg Morgan

No. 79-870:

United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz

(~r~~JS.~-)

Question Presented
In

this

constitutionality

u.s.c.
which

§

class
of

231b(h).

defines

the

the

action,

appellee

Railroad

Fritz

Retirement

challenges

Act

of

The question is whether §

3(h)

class

shall

of

individuals

who

the

1974,

45

of the Act,
receive

a

"windfall" retirement benefit representing payment from both the
Railroad Retirement Account and the Social Security Trust Fund,
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Background
(1) The Railroad Retirement System Before 1975.

from

the

Retirement

benefits

Railroad

Retirement

for

railroad

Account,

employees

not

from

are

the

paid

Social

2.

Security Trust Fund which pays retirement benefits to employees
in other industries.

Before the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974

took effect on January 1,
both

the railroad

for

retirement

industry and

benefits

system and the

1975,

individuals who had worked in
another

under

both

industry were

the

social security system.

railroad

"dual" benefit.

that

mechanics of paying such dual

financial

retirement

Upon retirement,

workers received a
the

eligible

In 1 97 0,

draining the Railroad Retirement Account.

those

Congress realized
benefits was

(I will not rehearse

the financial mechanics because they are described sufficiently
in

the

briefs

and

are

relatively

comprehensible.)

Therefore,

Congress created the Commission on Railroad Retirement to study
the actuarial soundness of the railroad retirement system.
(2)
In
Commission

The Passage of the Act
a

report

recommended

eliminated.

The

submitted
that

the

Commission

to

Congress

payment

recognized,

of

in

dual

however,

1972,

the

benefits

be

that

some

railroad employees had retired or made retirement plans upon the
expectation

of

receiving

dual

benefits.

Therefore,

the

Commission recommended that a grandfather clause provide for the
payment of dual

benefits to all

individuals who had qualified

receiving

Commission's

for them already.
After

the

recommendations,

Congress asked representatives of railroad labor and management
to

study

the

recommendations,

to negotiate,

and

to prepare

a

3.

bill

to

restructure

representatives

the

formed

railroad

the

Joint

Retirement Negotiating Committee.
with a

narrower

Commission.
dual

benefit

received

grandfather

In

it

upon

These

system.

Labor-Management

Railroad

The Committee proposed a bill

clause than

that

suggested by the

the Committee 1 s proposal eliminated the

short,

for

retirement

some

employees

who

otherwise

Congress

retirement.

passed

would

the

Act

have
after

legislative hearings at which Committee members testified about
the proposal and specifically about the grandfather clause.
(3)

The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974

The Act divides railroad

----

components.

One

component,

component,

corresponds

to

the

retirem~

benefits

called

the

"social

total

benefit

that

into ~

security"
an

employee

would receive if all of his railroad service had been covered by
the

Social

Security

Act.

The

second

component,

called

the

~ "staff" comp~nt, is a supplemental benefit for service in the
rai ~stry.

the

basis

service.

of

outside

employee 1 s

an

However,

benefits under
the

The social security component is computed on
combined

railroad

and

nonrailroad

if the employee is also eligible to receive

the Social Security Act

railroad

industry

insured under that Act),

long

(because he has worked

enough

to

be

permanently

then the social security component of

his railroad retirement benefit is reduced by the amount he is
paid

directly

nonrailroad

from

service.

the

Social

Security

Trust

This reduct ion eliminates dual

Fund

for

benefits,

4

with the except1on of the grandfather clause described

0

b~

The Act's grandfather clause, § 3(h), provides a third
component,

th~windfall "~ponent, which
dual ben~ employees.

called

preserves

the

employees

with

the

several

qualifications

~
onl~

effectively

But

described

below

~ ·

receive the windfall component.
First,

only

~

@)

employees who

have

qualifie &-~

fully

for benefits under both the railroad retirement system and the

M

social

~

security system as of January 1,

windfall
Thus,

component

employees

if

who

they

have

also

not

1975,

satisfy

completed

service by that date cannot qualify for

can receive the

~ <l-~.

other
10

J_~"l

requirements.

years

of

/--'

'7s-

railroad

the windfall component

by completing 10 years of service after that date, even if they
satisfied the other requirements.
Second,
both

systems

receiving

only employees who have qualified under

as of January 1,

dual

(~)~

benefits

as

197 5,

of

and have retired and

that

date,

qualify

. df a 11 component w1t
. h out sat1s
. f y1ng
.
w1n
any ot h er
Third,
systems

but

therefore

who

are

qualify for

have

not

employees
not

who

have

dual

'fl.- d?u- ~

for

the

~

.

qualified

benefits

are ~~

requ1rements. ~

retired as of January

receiving

as

1,
of

~-

under

both

1975,
that

and

date,

the windfall component only if they satisfy one of

three additional requirements as well:
One,

those

employees

must

connection" with the railroad as of December

~

have
31,

a

1974,

"current
or

the

5.

later date on which they retire--that is, they must have worked
for the railroad for 12 of the 30 months preceeding December 31,
1974, or the later date on which they retire.
Or two, those employees must have worked for
the railroad in 1974.
Or

three,

those

employees

must

have

completed 25 years of railroad service as of December 31, 1974.
Thus, employees who have qualified under both systems
but who have not retired as of January 1,
are

not

receiving

additionally do

~

dual

benefits

as

197 5,
of

and therefore

that

date,

and

have a current connection with the railroad

as of December 31, 1974 or the later date on which they retire,
did not work for the railroad in 1974, and have not completed 25
years

of

service

as

windfall component.

of December 31,

1974,

do not receive

the

(For graphic summary, see last page.)

Put less diagramatically, an individual with more than
10 years service in the railroad and sufficient nonrailroad work
to qualify for

social security benefits continues to receive a

dual benefit if he was retired and receiving a dual benefit as
of December 31, 1974.

Also, an individual who has completed 10

years of railroad service and sufficient nonrailroad service to
qualify for social security benefits, but who was not retired as
of December 31, 1974, receives the windfall component if he has
a current connection with the railroad as ot December 31,
or

the

later

date of

his retirement,

or

if he worked

for

1974
the

b.

railroad in 1974, or if he had 25 years of railroad service by
December 31,

1974.

fu!_t

an

unretired

individual who worked

in

the railroad for less than 25 years, and who neither worked for
the

railroad

railroad
does

not

in

as

1974

nor

of December

receive

the

had

31,

a

current

1974,

windfall

or

connection

his

component

with

the

date of retirement,
even

though

he

has

completed more than 10 years of railroad service and sufficient
nonrailroad service to qualify for social security benefits.
Put
railroad

in

work

an

and

example,
sufficient

an

individual

work

outside

with
the

11

years

of

railroad

to

qualify for social security benefits qualifies for the windfall
component by working for

the railroad in 1974, or

by having

a

current connection with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or
his later retirement date.
railroad
for

service and

social

security

But an individual with 24 years of

sufficient nonrailroad service to qualify
benefits

does

not

receive

the

windfall

component if he is unretired as of January 1, 1975, did not work
for the railroad in 1974, and did not have a current connection
with

the

railroad

as

of

December

31,

1974,

or

his

later

retirement date.
(4) This Litigation
Appellee Fritz represents a class of individuals who
do not qualify for

the windfall component.

The class consists

of individuals who retired after January 1, 1975, who worked for
the railroad for more than 10 years but less than 25, who left

~
1/_/7- . ..

~L..-

~

(

7.

the railroad industry for other employment before 1974, and who
did not return to the railroad industry and establish a "current
connection"

with

satisfy any one
receive

the

it
of

before

the

windfall

retiring.

three

Because

requirements

component

even

they

above,

though

do

not

they do

not

they

performed

sufficient nonrailroad service to become qualified for benefits
under both systems by December 31, 1974.

On
Court

for

that

cross motions

the

the

for

summary

Southern District of

Act

creates

an

judgment,

Indiana

District

the

( Holder,

irrational

~.

)

held

The

court

the

windfall

that

members

component.

The

of

appellee's

court

placed

class

great

be

paid

emphasis

on

its

finding that the principal purposes of the Act were to make the
railroad

retirement

system

actuarially

sound

and

to

protect

completely the dual benefits that railroad employees had already
earned.
which

In the court's view,
railroad

workers

would

the Act's scheme for determining
receive

the

failed to serve either of those purposes.
not

to

serve

the

purpose

of

making

windfall

component

The scheme was found

the

railroad

retirement

system actuarially sound because the financial need to deprive
some workers of

the windfall

Committee

agreed

obviously,

the

protecting

dual

to

component arose only because the

increase

scheme did not

other
serve

benefits earned

workers'

benefit.

the purpose of

by all

c:ur

therefore ~~

and

unconstitutional distinction between classes of annuitants.
ordered

be-

And,

completely

railroad workers.

The

~-

court also found that the labor representatives on the Committee
had breached a
appellee

and

increasing

"duty of fair representation"
his

class.

future

They

benefits

for

did

so,

persons

that they owed to

the

court

still

in

found,

the

by

railroad

industry at the expense of those, such as appellee, who had left
the

industry,

and

by

failing

to

notify

individuals

appellee of the proposed change in benefits.

such

Finally, the court

found that Congress did not know of the adverse effect of
scheme

upon

workers

such

as

appellee

as

because

of

the

misleading

testimony by Committee members.
This direct appeal comes to the Court under 28
§

u.s.c.

1252.

D;i.scussion
(1) The Statutory Scheme
(a) The Board's Arguments
Preliminarily,

the

Board

notes

that

railroad

retirement annuities are not contractual, and that "Congress may
alter,

and

Hisquierdo,
the

even

eliminate,

439 U.S.

572,

them at

575

any

(1979).

time."

Thus,

Hisquierdo v.

the Board argues,

line which Congress drew to distinguish workers who would

receive the windfall component from workers who would not is not
unconstitutional merely because
differently.

the Court would

draw

the

1 ine

Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-84 (1976).

In defense of the line which Congress drew,

the Board

9.

contends that the statutory scheme is rationally related to the
achievement of three legislative purposes:
One,
the

possible

Board's

view,

receiving

the scheme acknowledges the relative equities of
recipients
Congress

dual

of

the

concluded

benefits

in

windfall
that

1974 and

component.

In

retired workers

other

present

employees who had 25 years of service in the

the

already

and

former

industry,

or had

worked in the industry in 1974, or had a current connection with
the

industry at

the end of 1974,

or when they retired,

somewhat stronger equitable interest in receiving
than did workers,
the

industry

had a

the windfall

such as appellee and his class, who had left

prior

to

197 4

and

never

returned

to

it

before

retiring.
Two,
employees.

the

scheme

acknowledges

career

railroad

Awarding the windfall component to employees with 25

years of railroad service obviously acknowledges career railroad
service.

The Board contends that the "current connection" test

for workers with less

than 25 years service also acknowledges

career service because Congress has traditionally used that test
to

ensure

receiving
short,

some measure
benefits

Congress

of

under
could

career
the

status

railroad

reasonably

as

a prerequisite to

retirement

determine

system.
that

In

workers

currently connected with the railroad in 1974 when the Act was
considered and passed, and workers who left the railroad before
1974 but re-established a current connection with the railroad

IU.

before their retirement, were more likely to be career employees
than those who left the industry before 1974 and never returned
before retirement.
Three,

the

scheme

avoids

Railroad Retirement Account.
could

legitimately

drain,

while

required

decide

that

some

drain

on

the

The Board contends that Congress
that

preserving

substantial

the

less

the

need

most

to

avoid

equitable

equitable

financial

expectations,

expectations

not

be

recognized.
(b) Appellee's Arguments
Appellee contends that the legislative purposes of the
Act are not those which the Board suggests,
scheme
the

fai 1 s

that the statutory

to

serve

the true

legislative purposes,

scheme even

fails

to

the

serve

purposes

and

suggested

by

that
the

Board.
First,

appellee

contends

that

the

true

legislative

purposes were to make the railroad retirement system actuarially
sound and to protect completely the dual benefits of workers who
had earned them.
~

dual

benefits

contends
purpose

that
of

Obviously, the scheme fails to protect all the -T~
that
the

making

had

been

scheme

is

the

earned
not

railroad

before

rationally

retirement

1975.

Appellee

related

system

to

the

actuar ially

sound because the need to eliminate some dual benefits--that is,
appellee's and his class's--arose only when the Committee agreed
to increase the benefits of individuals working in or currently

I I •

connected
agreed,
could

to

the

railroad

appellee contends,

have

been

made

in

Had

197 4.

the

Commit tee not

then the railroad retirement

actuar ially

sound

even

while

so

system

protecting

appellee's dual benefit.
Second,

appellee

contends

that

the

serve the purposes suggested by the Board.
acknowledge
an

career

individual

service.

scheme

does

not

The scheme does not

service rationally because it measures when

worked

for

the

railroad,

not

the

length

of

Thus, as in the example on page 6, an individual who

worked for

the railroad for only 11 years receives the windfall

component if one of those years was 1974, but an individual who
worked

for

windfall

the

railroad

component

for

if neither

24

years

1974 nor

retirement was one of those years.
support

appellee's

contention

does

not

the year

receive

the

preceding his

Examples such as this also

that

the

scheme

does

not

acknowledge relative equities in a rational way.
(c) Analysis
Without having plumbed the depths of the legislative
history which both the Board and appellee cite exhaustively,

I

am inclined to conclude that the statutory scheme is rationally
related to the legislative purpose.
made

that

appellee

has

not

asked

judgment

for

Congress',

substitute

its

"advanc [ed]

principled

[the

line

To be sure, the case can be

Congress

reasoning

drew]

and

merely

that will

yet

tolerate

that

for
at
a

the

appellee
once

Court
has

invalidate

different

line

1~.

separating
Diaz,

some

426 U.S.

[railroad
at 82.

workers]

from

others."

Mathews

v.

The principled reasoning is that length

~

of

service,

employment

and

potential
has
.....

not occasion of

service,

acknowledges

recipients of

reflects

career

relative

the

the windfall

railroad

equities
But

component.

appellee

-------

not

among

shown persuasively that Congress could
~~-----------------conditioned eligibility for the windfall component

not

have

upon

the

character of the worker's ties to the railroad as well as upon
his

ties'

duration.

See

~

unquestionably

reasonable

id.

at

for

Congress

eligibility [for welfare benefits]

the

windfall

component

substantially served the rail road.
years

of

service

as

a

threshold

("In
to

short,

make

an

it

is

alien's

depend on both the character

and the duration of his residence.")
grant

82-83

Congress clearly wanted to

only

to

Thus,

workers

who

had

Congress required 10

requirement.

At

the

other

extreme, Congress presumed that workers who served the railroad
for 25 years were career railroad employees.

For those in the

middle ground, Congress chose to rely upon criteria other than
years of service to discern which employees were more like 25year employees and which were more like 10-year employees.

The

requirements of a current connection or of work in 1974 are not
irrational

criteria;

arguably,

they are

less arbitrary

than

a

flat number-of-years requirement.
Appellee's contention that Congress wanted to "protect
completely" all earned dual benefits is not persuasive either.

I.:S.

The

simple

and

sufficient

Congress,

proposed

the

must

Act,

be

answer

complete
presumed

is

that

the

Congress,

protect ion.
to

have

Commission,

rejected

by

the

not

passing

Commission's

proposal.
(2) The Committee's Alleged Misconduct
The

District

representatives

of

the

Court

found

Committee

that

sacrificed

labor

the

the

benefits

of

workers who had left the railroad in favor of increased benefits
for workers who were still connected - with the railroad, and that
Committee members concealed this sacrifice from Congress.

I

am

inclined to dismiss these find}ngs, and the contentions appellee
c---

makes

from

them,

representatives
class,

it

is

not

and

the

clear

"to

benefits

that

authority,

management

Assuming

irrelevant.

sacrificed

representatives'
labor

as

for

that

that

of

appellee

action

Congress

negotiate"

in

the

was

and

his

beyond

the

specifically
preparing

restructure the railroad retirement system.

labor

a

asked

bill

to

Even assuming that

the sacrifice was beyond the Committee's authority, Congress can
be presumed to have understood and ratified the sacrifice unless
the

evidence

Congress.

I

shows
find

clearly

appellee's

that

the

evidence

Committee

hoodwinked

significantly

less

than

convincing.

I
Court.

recommend

reversing

the

judgment

of

the

District

SECTION 3(h) of the RAILROAD RETIREMENT ACT OF 1974

Individual

Requirements for Windfall Component

Retired
& receiving dual
'benefit as of
1/1/75

qualify for benefits under both
systems as of 1/1/75, WITHOUT MORE

Unretired
as of
1/1/75

qualify for benefits under both
systems as of 1/1/75 AND:
(1) work for railroad in 1974
OR
(2) have current connection as
of 12/31/74 or later retirement date
OR
(3) have completed 25 years
railroad service as
of 12/31/74
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA.Tm s~~
No. 79-870
United States Railroad Retire-~ On. Appeal from the United
ment Board, Appellant,
States District Court for
'V.
the Southern District of
Gerhard H . Fritz
Indiana.

~
~ IAJ If-f{

~

[November -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Indiana held unconstitutional a section of the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. § 231 et seq., and the
United States Railroad Retirement Board has appealed to
this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252.
The 1974 Act f,!!ndamentall~ restructured the railroad retirement system. The Act's preaecessor statute, adopted in
1937, provided a system of retirement and disability benefits
for persons who pursued careers in the railroad industry,
Under that statute, a person who split employment between
railroad and nonrailroad service, and thus qualified for both
railroad retirement benefits and soeial security benefits, 42
U. S. C. § 401 et seq., could receive/ retirement benefits
umler both systems and an accompanying «windfall" benefit.1
1 Under the old Act, as under the new, 1tll employee who worked 10
years in the railroad bu::;ine:ss qtmlified for railroad retirement benefits.
If the employee <Llso worked out::;ide the railroad industry for a ~:>1Jfiicient
enough time to qualify for social security benefits, he qualified for dual
benefits. Due to the formula under which 1.hose benefits were computed,
however, persons who split their employment between railroad and
nonrailroad employment received dual benefits in excess of the amotmt
they would have received had they not split their employment. For

I

t/;ojr0

1
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'fhe legislative history of the 1974 Act shows that the payment of windfall benefits threatened the railroad retirement
system with bankruptcy by the year 1981.2 Congress therefore determined to place the system on a "sound financial
basis" by eliminating future accruals of the windfall benefits.3 Congress also enacted various transitional provisions,
example, if 10 years of either railroad or nonrajlroad employment would
produce a monthly benefit of $300, an additional 10 years of t.he same
employment at the same level of creditable compen:su.tion would uot
double that benefit, but would increase it uy some les::;er amount to :>ay
$500. If that 20 year:, of :service had been divided e4ually between
railro<~d and nonrailroad employment., however, the :social security benefit would be $300 and the railroad ret.iremcnt benefit would also be
$300, for a total benefit of $600. The $100 differenee in the example
co11.~tttutes the "windfall" benefit. See generally, S. Rep. No. 93-1163,
93d Cong., 2cl Se:>:s., 2-3 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1345, 93d Coug., 2d
&58., 2-3 (1974).
2 The relevant Connnillce Reports stated "Resolution of the so called
'dual benefit' problem i:s central both to in:suring the fi:scal :soundness of
the milroad ret.ircment sy:slcm tutd to c:st.abli:shing equitable retirement
benefit..; for all railroad employee:;." S. Rep. No. 93-1163, s·upra, at 11 ;
H. R Rep. No. 93-1345, IJUpm, at 11. The reason for the proulem was
thaL a financial interchange agreement entered into in 1951 between the
social security and milroad :sy:slcm,: cau:sed the entire cost. of t.he windfall
benefitl:l to be borne by tlw railroad Hystem, uot the social ::;ecurity
sy:>tem. The annual dmin on the milroad ::;y:>Lem amounted to approxi~
mately $450 million per year, and if it were not for "the problem of dual
beneficiaries, the railroad retirement system would be almost completely
solvent." !d., at 8.
3 8 . Rep. No. 93-1163, supra, at 1; H. R . Rep. No. 93-1345, supra, at. 1.
Congress eliminated future accruals of windfall benefits by rstabli:shing
a two-tier system for benefits. The fir::;t tier is mea~;ured by whnt the
social security ~ystem would pay on the ba.sis of combiuecl railroad and
nonrailroad servicP, while the second t.ier is based ou railroad service
alonr. However, bot.h tier:; are part. of tlw railroad retirement sy::;tem,
rather limn the fir,.;L tier being placed directly under social security, and
the bmefit:. actually paid by soctal security on the ba:si;; of nonrailroad
employment. are deducted so as to eliminate the windfaJl benefit.
The Railroad Hctireme11t Act of 1974 had its origin:, in 1970 when
€ongre::;s cre:.tted the Commi:s:sion of Railro;.~,d Het.irement to ::;tudy the
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including a grandfather provision, § 231 (h)/ which e>tpressly
preserved windfall benefits for some classes of employees.
In restructuring the Railroad Retirement Act in 1974,
actuarial soundness of the raHrond retirement sylltem. The ComtHi:s::;ion
submitted it:s report in 1972 and identified "dual benefit;:; and their attendant windfall::;" a:; one of the principle CUU::iC::i of the fillllllCiaf JjJiicuft.ieS
of the railroad retirement ~ystelll. It al:so found that windfall benetit8
were inequitable, fa,voring those employees who ;;plit their employ•
ment. over tho;;o employees who ;:;pent their ent.ire ca.reer in the ruilroa.d
indu::;try. Heport of the Commi;;::;ion on Railroad Retirement, The Hailroad Ret.ireltlent ~yst.em; It~ Coming Cri::;is, H. Doc. 92-350 (1\:172). lt
therefore rm·ommet}(led that future accruals of windfall benefits be elimi•
IHtlcd by the e:;tabli;;lunent of a two-tier ::;y::;tem, somewha.t similar to the
type of ~;y::;t.em ·e ventually adopted by Congre:;::;. It also recommended
tlmt "legally vested right~ of railroad worker:;" ue pre:;erved. An employee who WHJ:l fully in:sured lll}(!er both the railroad aml :;ocial security
::;y~tems as of the clnmgeover date ( i. e., by having at least 10 years of
railroad employment and requisite length of ~ocial l:*!Curity employment)
was deemed to have "legally vestetl right~;."
}'ollowing receipt of the Commi:;:;ion':; report, Congn>::>s reqtte:;ted metu•
her:> of nHLnagement, l:tbor, and retiree::; to form a Joint Labor iVIanage•
mcut Railroa.d Retirement Negotiating Committee (hereinafter known as
the Joint Committee) and :;ubmit a. report, "taking into account" the
recommendations of the Commi:;:;ion. The Joint Commit.tee outlined its
proposal:; in the form of a letter to Congress. 120 Cong. Rec. 1839118392 (April 10, 1974). Although it agreed with the Commi:s~:~ion that
future accruals of windfall benefits be eliminated, it differed as to the
protection to be afforded those already statutorily entitled to benefits and
recommended the transitional provisions that were eventually adopted
by Congress. A bill enacting tholle principles was drafted and submitted
to Congresll, where the relevant committees held lengthy hearings and
submitted d~tailed reports. SeeS. Rep. No. 93-1163, supra; H. R. Rep .
No. 93-1345, supra.
4 Section 3 (h) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C.
231b (h), provides, in pertinent part :
" (1) The LUJIOtlllt of the annuity . . . of an individual who (A) will
have (i) rendered service as an employee to an employer, or as an employee representative, during the calender year 1974, or (ii) had a current connection with the ra.ilroad industry on December 31, 1974, or at
the time his annuity under section 2 (a) (1) of this Act began to accrue,
or (iii) completed t wenty-five years of service prior to January 1,. 1975,
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Congress divided emplo ees into various groups. ~ those
employees w o lacked the reqmst
1 years of railroad
employment to qualify for railroad retirement benefits as of
January 1, 1975, the changeover date, would have their
retirement benefits computed under the new system and
would not receive any windfall benefit. ~hose individuals already retired and already receiving dual benefits as
of the changeover date, would have their beuefits computeq
UtH.ler the ~stern and would continue to receive a windfall
benefit.G C!JfifiP, those employees who had qualified for both
railroad and social security benefits as of the changeover date,
but who had not yet retired as of that date (and thus were
not yet reeeiviug dual benefits), were entitled to windfall
benefits if they had ( 1) performed some railroad service in
1974 or (2) had a "current connection" with the railroad
or (ii) completed twent.y-tive year;; of S('rvice prior to January 1, 1975,
ami (B) will have (i) completed ten yl:'ar;; of service prior to January 1,
1975, and (ii) been pernwnP11t.ly in~ured under the Society Security Act
on December 31, 1074, shall be incrcwsed by an amouut equal to Lthe
amount of windfall dual benefit he would have received prior to January
1, 1975] ..•
"(2) The amount of the a.unuity ... of an individual who (A) will
not !awe met the condition:; ~et forth in ;,;ubclau~o (i), (ii), or (hi) of
clau::;e (A) of ~ubdivi~ion (l) of thi:s suu:section, but (B) will have (i)
complt>ted ten yt>ar:s of :;ervice prior to .January 1, 1975, and (ii) been
pPrrnwll:'ntly in:-;ured under the Social St>curity Act as of DPccmber 31
of t.lw calendar year prior to 1975 in which he last rendered :service as an
employee to an l:'lllployer, or a:; llll employee repre:;ent~ltive, ;;hall be
increa..;ed uy an amount equal to t.ho amount ... [of windfall benefit
calcubtod at time he left the railroad ::;ervice]. ..."
The relevaut Committee Heports stated that the most "difficult problem"
was the ''manner in whieh dual bt•uefit" ::;hould be pha;;ed out on an
equitable ba::;i::;." S. Hep. No. 93-1163, supra, at 11; H. H. Hep. No. 931345, ISUpru, tLt 11.
5 88 Stat. 1353,

~ee note followiug 45 U. S. C. § 231. The tran:sitiou
provi;;ion:; in Title 11 of the bill are no~ included in the U. S. Code. The
windfall amount for retired emplo · ee~ i::; pre::;crved by §§ 204 (a) (3) and
(4) of the Act.
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industry as of December 31, 1946/ or (3) completed 25 years
of railroad ser~ December 31, 1974. 45 1J. S. C.
§ 231b (h) (1) . ~ those emp1oyees who had qualified
for railroad beuefits as of the changeover date, but lacked a
current connection with the railroad industry in 1974 and
lacked 25 years of railroad employment, could obtain a lesser
amount of windfall benefit if they had qualified for social
security benefits as of the year (prior to 1975) they left
railroad employment. 45 U. S. C. § 231b (h)(2). 7
Thus. an individual who, as of the changeover date, was
uuretired and had 11 years of railroad employment and sufficient nonrailroad employment to qualify for social security
benefits is eligible for the full windfall amount if he worked
for the railroad in 1974 or had a current connection with the
railroad as of December 31, 1974, or his later retirement date.
But an unretired individual with 24 years of railroad service
and sufficient nomailroad service to qualify for social security
benefits does not receive a windfall amount if he did not work
for the railroad iu 1974 and did not have a current connection
with the railroad as of December 31, 1974 or his later retirement date. Anti an employee who left the railroad industry
for other employment before 1974, and who was ueither permanently insured under the Social Security Act at that time
nor returned to the railroad industry to re-establish a "current
8 The term "current cmmection" is defined in 45 U. S. C. § 231 (o) to
111ean, in general, employment in the railroad industry in 12 of the preceding 30 caleu<.ler month~.
7 The amount of the "windft~ll componl:'nL" h; greater UIH.ler ~:>ubsection
(1) than under :sub~:>ection (2) of 45 U. S. C. § 23lb (h) . The former
con~:>isl.:s of benefit,; computl:'d on the ba.~is of ~:>ocial :;ecurity service
through December 31, 197-l, while the latter i,; computed on the ba:-;is
of ~:>Ocial :security service only t.hrough the years in which the individual
left the railroad indu~:>try . The difference eorre:spond:s to the different
datt>s by which th(' retirrd employ<'e mu~t have been permanent.ly in::mred
under the Social Security Act in ordt'r to be eligiblf' for an~· windfall
benefit.
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connection" with it before retiring, will not receive any windfall benefit, even if he subsequently qualified for social security benefits. It was with these complicated comparisons with
which Congress wrestled in 'f974.
Appellees filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, seeking a
declaratory judgment that 45 · U. ·s. C. § 231b (h) is unconstitutional under the Due Process CI~use of the Fifth Amendment becaus~ it irrationally distinguishes between classes of
annuitants. 8 The District Court eventually certified a class
of all persons eligible to retire between January 1, 1975 and
January 31, 1977, who were permanently insured under the
Social Security Act as of December 31, 1974, but who were
not eligible to receive any "windfall component" because
they had left the railroad industry before 1974, had no "current connection" with it at the end of 1974, and had less
than 25 years of railroad service. 0 Appellees contended below that it was irrational for Congress to have drawn a distinction between employees who had more than 10 years
but less than 25 years of railroad employment simply on the
basis of whether they had a "current conuectiou" with the
railroad industry as of the changeover date or as of the date
of retirement.
8

Although "the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause,

it tloel:l forbid discrimiuat.iml that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative
of due process.'" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163, 168 (1964). Thus,
if a federal :statute is valid under the Equal Protection Clau:se, it is perforce valid under the Due Process Clau:;e. Richardson v. Belcher, 404
(1971).
9 It is :somewhat unclear precisely who is and is not within the clas:;;
certified by the Di:strict Court. By its term~, the cla.s.~ certified by the
District Court would appear to include those employees who qualified
for reduced wimlfall bcn1~fits under § 2:31b (h) (2) by rea:;on of their
quulifyiug for :,ociul :security beudits H:l of the year they left. the railroad
iudu::;try. It. uppPurs, howevPr, that the Di::;trict. Court intended t.o include
in the cla:ss only those who, like appellee Fritz, are precluded · from ' auy
windfall benefit.

u.s. 78, 81
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The District Court agreed with appellt>es that a differentiation based solely on whether an employee was "active"
iu the railroad busiuess as of 1974 was not "rationally related" to the congressional purposes of insuring the solvency
of the railroad retirement system and protectiug vested benefits. We disagt·ee anu reverse.
The only i~ue preseuted by this case is the appropriate
standard of judicial review to be applied when social and
economic legislation euacted by Q :mgress is challengetl as
being violutive of the Fifth Amenument to the Unitt>d States
Constitution. There is 110 claim here that Cougre:ss ha~:; taken
propt>rty in violation of the Fifth Amendment. since railroad
benefits, likt- :social security benefits, are not coutractual and
may be altered or even eliminated at any time. Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo , 439 F. S. 572, 575 (1~79); Flemndny v. JVestor,
3o3 U. S. 6o:~. ()08- 611 (1960). Ami because the Jistinctions
dra·wn in ~ 2:Hb (h) do not burden fundamental constitutional rights or ereate "suspect" cla:ssifications, such as race
or national origin, WI:' may put ca&•s involving juJicial review
of such claims to one side. San A nton·io Tndependent School
Distr·ict v. Rodriyuez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973); Vance v. Bradley,
440 U.S. 93 (HI7\J).
Despite the narrowness of the i::;sue, this Court has not been
altogether cousistent in its prouounceuteu t in this area. As
long ago as L-indsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61. 78-79 (1911), the Court stated that appropriate staudard
to be:
11
1. The equal protectiou doctriue clause of the :Fourteenth
Amendment does not take from the state the power to
classify in the a~ptiou of j )olice la\~S. but admits uf the
ex~rcise of a wide scope of thseretwn in that regard, ami
avoids ·what is clone only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classificat:m, having so1ue reasonable basis dues uot offend
against that clau:;e merely because it is not lllade with

l

?
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mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in
some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a
law is called in question , if any s!_ate of facts reasonably
can be...,.___
conceived that would sustaill it, the existeilCe of
that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such
a law must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary."
Bv contrast, during an era when the Court was givi11g a broad
reading to both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protectiou Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate social
and economic legislation in a way which has siuce been largely
ab~ncloneil, thi~ Court stated the test more loosely, over the
dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes. It held that ~
classification to be valid under the Equal Protection Clause
"must rest upon some ground of differences having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation .. . ."
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412. 415 (1920).
In more recen year , 10wever, we have returned to the
standard announced in Lindsley and have consistently deferred to egis a 1ve e erminations as to the desirability of
statutory differentiations. E. g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U. S. 297, 303 (1975); Vauce v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97
(1979). In Flemming v. Nestor,' 363 U. S. 603, 611 (1960),
for example, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
social security eligibility provision, stating that:
"it is not within our authority to determine whether the
Congressional judgment expressed in that section is
sound or equitable, or whether it comports well or ill with
purposes of the Act. 'Whether wisdom or unwisdom
resides in the scheme of benefits set forth in l the Socia
Security Act] , it is not for us to say. The answer t
such inquires must come from Congress, not the court .
@ur concern here., as often, is with power, not with wi

.

'J
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dom.' Helvering v. Davis, [303 U. S. 619, 640] . Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare security program
such as this, we must recognize that the Due Process
Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the
statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification,
utterly lacking in rational justification."
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485-486 (1970),
the Court rejected a claim that Maryland welfare leg:slation
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It said:
"In the area of economic and social welfare, a State does
not violate ~qual Protection Clause merely because
the classifications made by its law are imperfect. If the
classification has some 'reasonable basis', it does not offend the Constitution si mply b ecause the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Linds1ey v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78. 'The problems of
government are practical ones and may justify, if they
do not require, rough accommodations-illogical, it may
be, and unscientific.' Metropolis 'l'heatre Co. v. City of
Chicayo, 228 U. S. 61, 68-70..
" [The rational basis standard] is true to the principle
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts
no power to impose upon the States their views of what
constitutes ~conomic or social p~cy."
Where the legislative purpose of the enactment may be
extremely obscure, it may be ~iate to search for some
unannoui1c~1:mt underlying 'purpose of tlie statute," arid
determine whetner e 'fit' etween at purpose and the
legislature's chosen means of accomplishing that purpose ~
rational.
Here, however, given that the legislative purpose
...____
of the statute is readily apparent from the language itself, no
such undertaking is required. As this Court has stated, the
0

0

?

7
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appropriate place to look for legislative purpose is the statute
itself.
ifanu v. Boles, 443 U. S. 282, 294 (197.::..
9 J..:.·---~
Applying these principles to this case, the plain language
~
of § 231b (h) indicates that Congress intended that certain
classes of railroad employees continue to receive full windfall
benefits. Because Congress could have elimiuated wiudfall
benefits altogether for classes of employees, it is not constitutionally impermissible for Cougress to have drawn lines
between groups of employees for the purpose of phasing out
those benefits. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U. S., at 305.
'I'he only remaining inqury is whether Congress achieved its
purpose in a patently arbitrary or irrational way. 'I'he classification here is uot arbitrary, says appellal1t, because it is an
attempt to protect the relative equities of employees and to
provide benefits to career railroad employees. Congress fully
protected, for example, the expectations of those employees
who had already retired and those unretired employees who
had 25 years of railroad employment. Conversely, Cougress
denied all windfall benefits to those employees who lacked
10 years of railroad employment. Congress additionally provided windfall benefits, in lesser amount, to those employees
who had 10 years railroad employmeut if they had qualified
for social security benefits at the time they had left railroad
employment, even though they lacked a current connection
with the industry in 1974.
'I'hus, the only eligible former railroad employees denied
all windfall benefits are those, like appellees, who had no
statutory entitlement to dual benefits at the time they left
the railroad industry, but thereafter became eligible for dual
benefits when they subsequently qualified for social security
benefits. Congress could properly conclude that persons who
had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater
equitable claim to those benefits than the members of appellees' class who were no longer in railroad employment when

:p

't
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they became eligible for dual benefits. Furthermore, the
"current connection" test in not a patently arbitrary mea11s
for determiniug which employees are "careet· railroaders,"
particularly since the test has been used by Congress elsewhere as an eligibility requirement for retirement benefits. 10
Congress could assume that those who had a current cotmection with the railroad industry when the Act was passed in
1974, or who returned to the industry before their retirement,
were more likely thau those who had left the iudustry prior
to 1974 and who never returned, to be among the class of
persous who pursue careers i11 the railroad industry. the class
for whom the Railroad Retirement Act was designed. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 F. S. 572. 573 (197~J).
Where, as here, there are plausible rea~:;ous for Congresst
action, our inquiry is at an eml. It is. of course, "coustitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning iu fact uuderlay
the legislative decisiou," Fleming v. 1\'estor, 363 U. S., at 612,
because this Court has 11evet· insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute. This is particularly true where the legislature must nece~:;sarily engage in
a process of line clrawing. The "task of classifying person3
for . . . benefits . . . iuevitably requires that some perl:lolli3
who have an almost equally strong claim to favorite treatment
be placed on different sides of the li11e," M(dhews v. Diaz,
10 The "current connection" t();;t has been used ;;incc 19-!6 us an
eligibility requirement for both occupational di~Xtbility and ;;urvivor
annuitieo~, 45 U. S. C. §§ ::ma (a) (1) (iv), 231a (d) (1) (eh. 70\:J, §§ :203,
205, 213, 60 St4\t. 726-7;}5), and it ha:-; been u:scd since 1U66 iu determining eligibility for a :supplemental annuity. 45 U. S. C. :201a (b)(l) .
(Pub. L. 89-699, § 1, SO Stat. 107a.)
Appellees contend th:~t the cunent counrctiun te:>t i~ impermi~~ible
because it draw~ a di~tinetion not on t.hc duration of rmployllll'llt. but
mther on the time of employml'lll. But thi~ CourL ha:; clearly held
that Congres::; may condition eligibility for berwfit~ ~ueh a::; these on the
character as well as the duration of un Pmployce'::; ties to an indu::;t•ry.
Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 74, n . 4 (1970).
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42G U. S. 67, 83-84 (H)70), and the fact the liue might have
been drawn differently at some points is a matter for legis~
lative, rather than judicial, consideration.
Finally, we disagree with the District Court's conclusion
that Congress was unaware of what it accomplished or that
it was mislrcl by the groups that appeared bE>fore it. If this
test were applied literally to every nwmber of any legis~
lature that ever votPd on a law. there would be very ff'w laws
which would survive it. The language of the statute is
clear, and we haw h istorieally assumed that Congress in~
tcJH!ecl what it rnactf'd. To br sur0, appellet>s lost a political
battle i11 whieh they hacl a strong interf'st, but this is neither
tlH' first nor the last tinw that such a result will occur in the
legislative forum. What we have said is e11ough to dispose
of the claims that C'oJJgrf'SS not (Hlly failNI to accept appel~
le0s argument as to rrstructuring i'll toto, hut that sueh fail~
urc' drniNI thrm equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
thr Fifth Ame1Hlmrnt. 11
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is

Reversed.

l1 As wo hn,·c rerrntly stnir<l, "Tho Con~iit . nt ion prr.<nmc~ t.h at. nhscnt
some rcaFon to infcr autipathy, c\·Pn impmYidrnt. dec:i~ion will c•n•ntually
be rcct.ified by tho dcnwrratic pror('""<'>' and that. jndiria.l infpn·<·nlion is
gcncr:dly 1111\\':tJT:Ill kd no mat tcr h01r JJJHri~cly we may I hink a politicul
brunch has acted." Vanc e v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 03, 07 (1070) .
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CHAMBE:RS OF

JUSTICE

w.. . J .

BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

November 10, 1980

No. 79-870 Railroad Retirement

Board v. Fritz

Dear Bi 11:
I will be circulating a separate opinion, probably
a dissent, in the above in due course.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

;$u:p-:rtltt.C Qfcurl ttf tltt ~~ j)taftg
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C HAMBERS OF

November 10, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/

/

Re: No. 79-870 - United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz
Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

--

Mr. Justice Re hnquist
cc: The Conference

/

.§u:prmu <!Jourl of t.ltt~nfu~ ~,fattg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 10, 1980

RE:

No. 79-870, United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,
C) ('
1

.>'

/
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

November 10, 1980
79-870

u.s.

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
I regret to say that your draft opinion's
discussion of equal protection analysis may make it
difficult for me to join the opinion in its present form.
On page 7, the draft reads:
"The only issue presented by this case is the
appropriate standard of judicial review to be
applied when social and economic legislation
enacted by Congress is challenged as being
violative of the Fifth Amendment. • • "
I had not understood that this question actually
is presented. The parties do not question the standard of
judicial review. Rather, I understand from the briefs that
they agree that the appropriate standard is the rational
basis test, and the issue - as I perceive it - is whether
the statutory scheme meets that test.
I agree that it does.
But your framing of "the only issue presented" and
your reliance on the language in Lindsley to the effect that
"if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain [the legislation]", and your further statement
that after departing from the Lindsley test we more recently
have returned to it, gives me a problem in view of what I
have previously written.
I am reminded of my effort in Murgia to formulate
a rational basis standard to which we all could subscribe.
After getting caught in a "cross-fire", I finally said very
little beyond the bare statement that the state's
classification "rationally furthered the purpose identified
by the state". Subsequently, in Maher v. Roe, again
avoiding any attempt to "restate" the law of Equal

2.

Protection, I merely said that the rational basis test
"requires that the distinction drawn • • . be rationally
related to a constitutionally permissible purpose."
I have never been happy with the "any conceivable
basis" test applied in Lindsley and McGowan v. Maryland.
Guessing what legislators "conceivably" might have intended
does not appeal to me as any standard at all.
In a number
of cases that I wrote somewhat earlier (Weber, James v.
Strange and Frontiero), I stated my view that "this Court
requires, as a minimum, that a statutory classification bear
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
Your opinion does end up stating that a Court must
determine whether the "fit" between the legislative purpose
and its means of accomplishing that purpose is "rational".
But in the same sentence, you also state:
/ /
. ,-

""

"Where the legislative purpose of the enactment
may be extremely obscure, it may be appropriate to
search for some unannounced, but underlying
1
purpose of the statute 1 • • • " .
It may be that a majority of the Court will agree
with what you have written.
In that event, I will join the
judgment and probably write separately.
I do think,
however, that the portions of your opinion mentioned above
are unnecessary, and that the question as stated by you
presents an issue not before us.
Where social and economic legislation are
concerned, my own disposition is to be tolerant of a
legislative classification. But in view of what I have
written, often joined by a majority of the Court, I would be
uncomfortable with the portions of your opinion I have
identified.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

...

cc:

The Conference

lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 12, 1980

Re:

79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz

Dear Bill:
Before receiving Lewis' letter, I had sketched out
the attached draft of an opinion concurring in the
judgment. As you will note, I also had concluded that
your opinion was somewhat misleading because there had
been no argument addressed to the way in which the
standard of review should be formulated.
In all events, this is just a preliminary draft
which I probably will withdraw if you are able to
accommodate Lewis, or if he writes a more thorough
concurrence.
Respectfully,
I )

,

)!.
/

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

"

FIRST DRAFT

79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the outcome in this
case depends on the phrasing of the standard for deciding whether
the statutory classification has a "reasonable basis".
at 7, 9. 1

See ante,

Rather, the decisive questions are (1) whether

Congress can rationally reduce the vested benefits of some

1 Neither the District Court nor the appellees even cited
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 u.s. 412; nor did they disagree
about the phrasing of the appropriate standard of review. The
court's discussion of what it describes as "the only issue
presented by this case," ante, at 7, is therefore the purest form
of dictum. The basis for the District Court's decision is
summarized in Conclusions of Law 19-20, reading as follows:
"19. The classification created by the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 as defined in
Conclusion 2 above is not rationally related
to either the purpose of making the Railroad
Retirement Fund actuarially sound or the
purpose of protecting completely those
persons who were entitled to receive both
Social Security and Railroad Retirement Act
benefits under previous law.
~
"20. The classification as defined in
Conclusion 2 above is unconstitutional under
the equal protection component of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Such
classification is arbitrary, capricious and
irrational and denies Plaintiff Class equal
protection under the law." Juris. Statement
30a-3la.

...

~

,. '

No. 79-870

- 2 employees in order to improve the solvency of the entire program
while it simultaneously increases the benefits of others; and (2)
whether, in deciding which vested benefits to reduce, it may
favor annuitants whose railroad service was · more recent than that
of disfavored annuitants who had an equal or greater quantum of
employment.

The first question should be answered affirmatively because
the congressional purpose to eliminate the windfall benefits is
unquestionably legitimate, and steps to accomplish that goal
remain reasonable notwithstanding the need to make an overall
adjustment in the level of remaining benefits in response to
inflation in the economy.

An affirmative answer to the second question is also
reasonable.

Because some hardship--in the sense that legitimate

expectations are frustrated--will inevitably result from the
reduction in vested benefits, it was surely reasonable for
Congress to decide not to eliminate all vested windfall benefits.
Having made that decision, any distinction within the class of
vested beneficiaries would necessarily involve a difference of
~

degree rather than a difference in entitlement.

Since retirement

plans frequently provide greater benefits for recent retirees
than for those who retired years ago--and thus give a greater
reward for recent service than for past service of equal
duration--the basis for the statutory discrimination is supported
by precedent.

In my judgment that is a "reasonable basis" as

No. 79-870
- 3 -

that term is used in Linsley, ante, at 8 and Dandridge, ante, at
9, as well as a "ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation", as those
words are used in Royster Guano, ante, at 8.

I, therefore, concur in the judgment.

t

November 10, 1980
79-870 U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bi 11:
I regret to say that your draft opinion's
discussion of equal protection analysis may make it
difficult for me to join the opinion in its present form.
On page 7, the draft reads:
"The only issue presented by this case is the
appropriate standard of judicial review to be
applied when social and economic legislation
enacted by Congress is challenged as being
violative of the Fifth Amendment • • • "
I had not understood that this question actually
is presented. The parties do not question the standard of
judicial review. Rather, I understand from the briefs that
they agree that the appropr1ate standard is the rational
basis test, and the issue - as I perceive it - is whether
the statutory scheme meets that test. I agree that it does.
But your framing of "the only issue presented" and
your reliance on the language in Lindale~ to the effect that
"if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain [the legislation]", and your further statement
that after departing from the Lindsley test we more recently
have returned to it, gives me a problem in view of what I
have previously written.
I am reminded of my effort in Murgia to formulate
a rational basis standard to which we all could subscribe.
After getting caught in a "cross-fire", I finally said very
little beyond the bare statement that the state's
classification "rationally furthered the purpose identified
by the state". Subsequently, in Maher v. Roe, again
avoiding any attempt to "restate" the law of Equal

2.

Protection, I merely said that the rational basis test
"requires that the distinction drawn • • • be rationally
related to a constitutionally permissible purpose."
I have never been happy with the "any conceivable
basis" test applied in Lindsley and ~cGowan v. Maryland.
Guessing what legislators "conceivably" might have intended
does not appeal to me as any standard at all. In a number
of cases that I wrote somewhat earlier (Weber, James v.
Strall9.£ and Frontiero), I stated my view that "this Court
requires, as a minimum, that a statutory classification bear
a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
Your opinion does end up stating that a Court must
determine whether the "fit" between the legislative purpose
and its means of accomplishing that purpose is "rational".
But in the same sentence, you also state:
"~.qhere the legislative purpose of the enactment
may be extremely obscure, it may be appropriate to
search for some unannounced, but underlying
'purpose of the statute' • • • ".

It may be that a majority of the Court will agree
with what you have written. In that event, I w1ll join the
judgment and probably write separately. I do think,
however, that the portions of your opinion mentioned above
are unnecessary, and that the question as stated by you
presents an issue not before us.
Where social and economic legislation are
concerned, my own disposition is to be tolerant of a
legislative classification. But in view of what I have
written, often joined by a majority of the Court, I would be
uncomfortable with the portions of your opinion I have
identified.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 13, 1980
Re:

No. 79-870
Fritz

United States Railroad Retirement Board v.

Dear Lewis:
I have read your letter of November lOth, and spoken to you
about it on the telephone.

If all claims of constitutional

invalidity under the Equal Protection Clause were to be decided
by this Court, I would be able to write the opinion in this case
with a statement of facts and a series of string citations to
opinions from this Court, and probably get six or seven votes for
the opinion without any trouble.

For me there are two

difficulties with this approach to writing the opinion:

first,

the string citations would necessarily include some statements
that were not consistent with one another, and second, all
challenges to state or federal legislation on equal protection
grounds will not be decided by this Court.

A district judge or a

Court of Appeals may therefore pick and choose among the various
"standards" or "tests", depending on whether it is desired to
invalidate the statute or sustain it.

Granted that it is very

- 2 difficult to define the "rational basis" standard, if we leave
the case law the way it is now we will, in my opinion, be leaving
in the hands of four or five hundred lower federal court judges
an authority very much like a governor's veto:

the statute is

unwise, the legislative "purpose" could have been accomplished in
a seemingly more fair way, ergo the statute a violates the equal
protection guarantee.

Since each of us was here during the

agonizing debates over Murgia and Dukes during the October '75
Term, it may not be possible to get any agreement beyond merely
saying that the standard in this case is that of a "rational
basis". · But I would like to make one more effort to indicate
that it is a legal standard, and not simply a "chancellor's foot"
veto~

with that in mind, I suggest the following changes in my

first draft which I am willing to make in response to your letter
if Potter and Harry, who have already joined the draft, are
agreeable to them.
Pages 1 through the first part of 7 would remain as they
are.
On page 7, I would rephrase the paragraph beginning at the
bottom of the page as follows:
Despite the narrowness of the issue, this Court in earlier
cases has not been altogether consistent in its pronouncement in
this area.

In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220

u.s. 61,

78-79 (1911), the Court said that "When the classification in
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such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time that the law was enacted must
be assumed."

220

u.s.

61, 78-79.

On the other hand, only nine

years later in Royster Guanno Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920), the Court said that for a classification to be valid
under the Equal Protection Clause it "must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation ••• ".
In more recent years, however, we have determined that in
cases involving social and economic benefits, the Court has
consistently refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds
legislation which

~

simply

deem~

unwise or unartfully drawn.

Thus in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-486 (1970),
the Court rejected a claim that Maryland welfare legislation
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It said:
"In the area of economic and social welfare,
a State does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by
its law are imperfect. If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis', it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification
'is not made with mathematical nicety or because
in practice it results in some inequality.'
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78. 'The problems of government are

- 4 -

practical ones and may justify, if they do not
require, rough accommodations -- illogical, it
may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre
Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 u.s. 61, 68-70 ••••
"[The rational basis standard] is true to
the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment gives
the federal courts no power to impose upon the
States their views of what constitutes wise
economic or social policy."
Of like tenor are Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979), and

u.s. 297, 303 (1975). Earlier, in
u.s. 603, 611 (1960), the Court upheld

New Orelans v. Dukes, 427
Flemming v. Nestor, 363

the constitutionality of the social security eligibility
provision, saying that :
"It is not within our authority to determine
whether the congressional judgment expressed in
that Section is sound or equitable, or whether it
comports well or ill with purposes of the Act •
•... The answer to such inquiries must come from
Congress, not the Courts. our concern here, as
often, is with power, not with wisdom."
And in a case not dissimilar from the present one, in that
the state was forced to make a choice which would undoubtedly
seem inequitable to some members of a class, we said:

"Applying the traditional standard of review
under [the Equal Protection Clause], we cannot
say that Texas' decision to provide somewhat
lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients is
invidious or irrational. Since budgetary
constraints do not allow the payment of the full
standard of need for all welfare recipients, the

...
~

.

.
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State may have concluded that the aged and infirm
are the least able of the categorial grant
recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate
standard of living. While different policy
judgments are of course possible, it is not
irrational for the State to believe that the
young are more adaptable than the sick and
elderly, especially because the latter have less
hope of improving their situation in the years
remaining to them. Whether or not one agrees
with this state determination, there is nothing
in the Constitution that forbids it." Jefferson
v. Hackney, 406 u.s. 535, 549.
I would then propose to go over to page 10 of the present
draft, and, omitting the first two lines on that page, keep pages
10, 11, and 12 as they are.
If this or something very much like it would be acceptable
to you, and to Potter and Harry was well, I would be glad to
redraft those parts of the opinion which I have discussed.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart
Copy to Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copy to Mr. Justice Stevens

.:§u:prtmt
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C H AM BERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 13, 1980
Re:

No. 79-870

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear John:
Before receiving your letter of November 12th, I
had spoken to Lewis on the telephone and prepared the
attached letter to him. While your letter of November 12th
is technically correct when it says at footnote 1 that
"Neither the district court nor the appellees even cited
Royster Guano v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412", they do cite
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) which uses the
Royster language. At any rate, I attach a copy of the
letter which I have written to Lewis, and sent to Potter
and Harry after they had joined my proposed opinion, so
that you may see what the current state of the debate or
exchange is.
Sincerely~

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart
Copy to Mr. Justice Blackmun

...

-

'-'

Supreme Court of the United States
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-------------------------------------' 19--------
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 13, 1980

Re:

79-870 - Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz

Dear Bill:
Thank you for sharing your letter to Lewis with
me. My disagreement with your draft in this case does
not qualify in the slightest my great respect for your
cooperative approach to the task of preparing Court
opinions.

I

As I understand your proposed changes, however,
you intend to retain the statement on page 7 that the
"only issue presented by this case is the appropriate
standard of judicial review • • • • " That sentence
presents me with what is probably an insurmountable
hurdle. The litigants did not present us with that
issue but instead did raise other issues; therefore, as
I presently view the case, I will not be able to join
an opinion which either contains that statement or is
organized as a response to a similar statement. In all
events, I will await the outcome of your negotiations
with Lewis before trying to put my separate concurrence
in final form.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell

.:§u:puntt ~tntrl cf tltt 'Jfuritt~ .:§hrltg
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 13, 1980

Re:

No. 79-870, U.S. Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill,
I have no objection whatever to changes
in your opinion along the lines specified in
your letter to Lewis of November 13.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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To:

11/14/80
Mr. Justice Powell

From: Greg Morgan
Re:

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz:

LETTER TO WHR

Having read your rough-draft letter to Mr.
Rehnquist, I offer the following thought:

J~~

You are entirely

correct, but you already have won most of the battle.

~,------~---~--------------------~------~

You are entirely correct that WHR has misstated the
issue presented and that the discussion of Lindsley and Royster
Guanno would be unnecessary if the issue were stated as briefed
and argued.

~

Of course, WHR misstated the issue because he

wished to discuss those cases.

However, WHR has conceded most

of what you sought in your first letter to him by removing much
of the troublesome language from that discussion.

The trouble

with what remains of that discussion is not that it approves a
test with which you disagree (I argued this in my memo of
11/13), but merely that it is unnecessary.

For that reason, I

think that you could join the o inion as its stands revised.
Let me repeat my agreement with you, however, that
WHR persists in misstating the issue and that the Lindsley and
Royster discussion is unnecessary.
for revision, I add one thought:

If you decide to ask again
WHR's concern is that lower

courts today can "pick and choose" from the various "tests" in
the Court's precedents.

Wanting to convey the message that the

Dandridge - Hackney line of cases contains the test by which

2•

.,

the Court stands today, WHR might do better, as your letter
suggests, simply to emphasize that line rather than continue
reiterating the obvious fact that there are inconsistent
"tests" from which to choose.

In short, not only does WHR not

need to rehearse Lindsley and Royster to make his point, but
might be disserving his own purpose by airing yet again the
available "tests."
In sum,

! would join the revised opinion, especially

because WHR has gone so far to accommodate your suggested
revisions.
I have noted a few typographical mistakes and
suggested a couple stylistic changes.

GM

11/13/80

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From: Greg Morgan
Re:

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
I have reviewed Mr. Justice Rehnquist's suggested

revisions and conclude that they may ease your concerns
somewhat but perhaps not completely.

The revision removes (1)

the statement that the Court in recent years has "returned to
the standard announced in Lindsley" [pg 8.

,I

2];

(2) much of

the language quoted from Lindsley and Flemming to suggest the
"any conceivable basis" standard [pg. 7-8, & pg. 9]; and (3)
the statements about legislative "purpose" [pg. 9,

~

3].

These

were statements which your letter of Nov. 10 suggested were
troublesome to you.
The revision does not remove what I continue to find
an inaccurate statement of the issue in the case [pg.7,

~2],

-

nor does it remove the language from Lindsley which can suggest
t he "any conceivable basis" test (" ••• if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived

" [pg. 8]).

Your Nov. 10 letter

specifically objected to both of these statements.
The bottom line is this:

The revised opinion quotes

language from Lindsley suggesting the "any conceivable basis"
test, but the opinion does not re-affirm that language or
endorse it as the test which the Court is following in this
case.

Rather, the opinion relies on language from Dandridge

2.

[pg.3-4 of WHR's letter] and unobjectionable language from
Flemming [pg. 4 of letter; pg. 8 of first draft] to state the
test which the Court relies on today.

This being so, Mr.

Justice Rehnquist's re-statement of equal-protection analysis
is not inconsistent with your statements in previous cases.

November 17, 1980
79-870

u.s.

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
Thank you for your letter of November 13,
proposing changes in the first draft of your opinion for the
Court.
To a substantial degree, the suggested changes
meet my concerns. I would hope, however, that you would
state the issue as it is presented by the parties. See the
Question as framed by appellee.
In view of the changes you have made that
eliminate the language that presented the greatest
difficulty for me, I will join your opinion to assure that
you have a Court.
I do add this observation: Your concern is that
lower courts today can "pick and choose" ; among the various
"tests" found in Court's precedents. I would think the
best way to convey your message to the contrary is to
emphasize that certainly since Dandridge/Hackney the Court
has adhered consistently, with respect to classifications
involving social and economic benefits, to the
straightforward rational basis test.
Putting it
differently, apart from being irrelevant as I view them, it
seems to me that harking back to Lindsley (1911) and Royster
(1920) could merely divert attention from the consistent way
in which certainly a majority of the Court has applied the
rational basis test to legislation of this kind. The
decisions last Term in Harris v. McRae, and Zbaraz are
recent examples, although the vote in those cases for
understandable reasons was close.

'

'
·- ~ ' - '
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CHAMBERS OF

November 17, 1980

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 79-870 - United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
No word has been forthcoming as yet from the Chief, Byron
or Thurgood.
Thus, at the moment, your ability to command a
Court depends on accommodation with Lewis and John.
For what it may be worth, I have no objections to the
changes you describe in your letter of -November 13 to Lewis.
Sincerely,

pi
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Stevens
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CHAMBERS OF"

November 17, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

79-870 -

u. s.

Railroad

Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

/
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CHAM!!IERS

Or

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

November 17, 1980

Re:

79-870 - U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
I join.

),

.j

Mr. Justice

Regards,

RehnquisV)

Copies to the Conference

'
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CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 21, 1980

Re:

79-870, U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v.
Fritz

Dear Bill:
The changes that you have made in order to
accommodate Lewis prompted me to restudy the question
whether I might join you.
I recognize that at this
stage you may well feel that you've invested enough
time in trying to accommodate your colleagues,
particularly since you probably have a Court.
Nevertheless, I will identify the specific points that
still trouble me.
I will join your opinion if you
would make the following changes.
Page 9:
In the last line of the text substitute
the words "provides the answer to" for the words "marks
the beginning and end of".
Page 9:

Omit footnote 10 entirely.

Page 11: Rewrite the last few lines of the text
to read this way:
"Where, as here, there are
acceptable reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is
at an end. This Court has never insisted that the
legislative body ..• "
Page 12, line 5: Substitute "favored" for
"favorite" and two lines later substitute the date 1976
for 1970.
Omit the second sentence in the full paragraph on
page 12.

- 2 -

If I join you, I will of course withdraw my
separate writing. However, I would thoroughly
understand if you simply say you've made all the
changes you intend to make.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

Mr. Justice Powell

November 21, 1980

79-870

u.s.

Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

...

J
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CHAM BERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 24, 1980
Re:

No. 79-870

U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz

Dear John:
I appreciate your letter of November 21st, suggesting
additional changes in the second draft of the opinion.
I
had the feeling that in revising that draft as I did in
accordance with the discussions I had with Lewis, I went
about as far as I cared to go in the matter. Since Lewis
has now joined, and I seem to have a Court opinion, I am
loath to try to make any additional changes that would
embroil us still further in the Murgia and Dukes discussions
of October Term, 1975. Therefore, I believe I will let
the matter rest as is.
Sincerely, , . ~· ··
1'\.

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

;§n.prtmt <!Jou.rt nf tlrt ~nifdt ~tal:ts
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 4, 1980

Re:

No. 79-870 - U.S. Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincererly,

~·
T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference
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